Where the parties use a variety of phrases to describe a transaction, the fact finder will need to resolve the question of the intention to be bound on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence. This is a classic jury function and clearly suggests that each case, to a large extent, will be bottomed on its own facts. Further, the question is not simply whether Getty thought itself to be bound or whether it perceived unresolved gaps in the agreement; the question is what Getty communicated to Pennzoil, the other contracting party. Thus, the law of contracts mixes an examination of subjective intention with an examination of objective behaviour that might cause the other party to rely on the existence of a contract. In other words, for hundreds of years and conventional wisdom notwithstanding, contract law focuses on both subjective agreement and objective fault in determining a relationship.
Moving along, on January 6, 1984, a Getty/Texaco agreement was announced at $125 a share, and subsequently the formal documents were executed. The second sale of Getty, however, involved at least three unusual provisions. First, no warranty was made or given with respect to the Getty shares in relation to the earlier Pennzoil transaction. Second, Texaco indemnified the Company, the Museum, and the Trust with respect to any liability arising out of the Pennzoil transaction. Third, if Texaco were unable to consummate the purchase of Getty Oil, Texaco guaranteed the Museum precisely $112.50 per share, the discounted value of the Pennzoil price.
On January 6, 1984 , Getty Oil filed a declaratory action in Delaware, and on January 10, Pennzoil sought equitable relief, namely, specific performance of the contract, in its own suit against the Getty parties. Texaco also was joined as a defendant and charged with tortious interference with the Pennzoil/Getty contract. On February 6, 1984 , the Chancellor in Delaware denied the requested preliminary injunction, citing the adequacy of Pennzoil's claim at law for damages. In reaching this conclusion, the Chancellor, a man with long experience in commercial litigation and not tainted as a Texas judge or attorney, opined that Pennzoil was likely to prevail in its allegation that a binding contract had been reached with the Getty parties. Pennzoil responded by dismissing its suit against Texaco in Delaware -Texaco having declined to file an answer there -and filed a tortious interference lawsuit in Houston in order to obtain ajury trial. In both Delaware and Texas, the parties agreed that New York law governed the substance of the dispute.
The mass media and many lawyers have examined this phase of the litigation and largely focused on Texaco's tactical blunder in failing to file an answer in Delaware. But, with all due respect, there are two far more important points to be made about the Delaware litigation. First, the Chancellor's decision indicates how foolish the ancient rules are about specific performance in the modem context. Specific performance should have been the remedy of choice, not the remedy of last resort, applicable only if damages were inadequate. The dissolution of the Getty/Texaco deal and adherence to the original Getty/Pennzoil contract would have obviated the necessity of valuing the huge assets in dispute. And that valuation process is more complex for the courts than specific performance would have been. The oil reserves, placed in Pennzoil's hands, would have been worth what they were worth, and there would have been no need to calculate the cost of Pennzoil securing those assets elsewhere in the marketplace. Second, a Delaware Judge, sitting without a jury, preliminarily reached the same decision on the binding nature of the contract as subsequent Texas Judges and the jury.
After extensive discovery, the case went to trial in July 1985, and the trial ended in November with the now-famous verdict, which was affirmed on appeal. Despite what one sometimes reads in the media, the drafting of the proposed jury charge began months before the conclusion of the trial, and Pennzoil lawyers produced ten to fifteen drafts of the charge before final submission to the Trial Judge. The Judge's copy of the charge was fully annotated to the New York precedents and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.'
II. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL DOCTRINES
While it may appear surprising to some, the legal doctrines applicable to this litigation were not novel or innovative but were deeply embedded in New York's common law of contracts and torts. The fact that a case involves many billions of dollars does not mean that the result hinges on some radical extension of traditional legal principles. Support was found for the charge in the treatises of Professors Corbin, Williston, Murray and Farnsworth, in the two Restatements of Contracts, and definitively, in the case law of New York. While New York law, like that of any state, has its own departures and nuances, the fact is that there is something approaching a national law of contracts, particularly in terms of contract formation. This is an important point. If you wish to determine contract law in any particular jurisdiction, the Restatement and the treatises most often will yield an excellent first approximation. The real differences among jurisdictions may lie more in the diversity of rules of procedure and the allocation of functions between judge and jury than in substantive contract law.
Consider, for example, Special Issue No. 1: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the end of the Getty Oil board meeting of January the 3d, 1984, Pennzoil and each of the Getty entities ... intended to bind themselves to an agreement" that included the price per share, the respective ownership interests, and the good faith effort to restructure Getty or to liquidate the company if agreement was not reached by December 31 st, 1984? Perhaps this Special Issue sounds familiar, for this formulation of the intention to be bound is taught in every contracts course in America. A Restatement Comment (Section 33) makes this point well when it states that "where the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy", the contract is enforceable. If there are open terms or terms to be discussed, these are only evidentiary of whether the parties did or did not intend to be bound -a point succinctly made in the instructions to thejury. In other words, the old and highly formalistic doctrine that there must be an agreement on all essential terms for a contract to come into being has been replaced by a global inquiry into intention to be bound.
But what of the fact that the formal merger documents had not been executed? The law of New York, as is the law of every other jurisdiction that we have examined, is that "the mere fact that the parties contemplate memorializing their agreement in a formal document does not prevent their informal agreement from taking effect prior to that event".' The correct answer, then, is that the parties control the intention to be bound to a contract and that they may choose to be bound immediately despite a promise to execute a formal writing, or they may choose only to be bound when the formal document is completed and signed. This principle, embodied in the jury instructions, hardly qualifies as a radical principle -except on some editorial pages. We have found American cases standing for this proposition going back to at least 1877. And Professor Corbin, writing in 1952 and not realizing how he might upset I. The Trial Judge's Charge To The Jury and Pennzoil's Proposed Annotated Charge To the Jury are set out in Appendices "A" and "B", inli'a.
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V If [the parties'] expressions convince the court that they intended to be bound without a formal document, their contract is consummated, and the expected formal document will be nothing more than a memorial of that contract. In very many cases the court has been convinced that such was the intention and has held the parties bound by a contract even though no document has been executed.
For the Trial Judge to have taken this hotly-contested factual question from the jury in Houston, as some have suggested, would have been an egregious error. The jury took its responsibilities seriously, and, weighing all of the evidence, it concluded, unanimously, that the parties did intend to be bound by the Memorandum of Agreement and by the subsequent action of the Getty Board.
Other aspects of the contract submission similarly were rooted in established law. Did Pennzoil and Getty have a duty to use reasonable efforts and to act in good faith to reach a definitive merger agreement? Common sense and the law tell us yes. Indeed, the evolution of this branch of contract law largely began with Justice Cardozo, perhaps the greatest state judge ever to sit on the Court of Appeals of New York, in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, a 1917 New York decision. 4 Subsequent New York cases and the Restatement build upon his wisdom. Is it in error to use the word agreement rather than the word contract in the jury charge? This is perhaps the silliest accusation of all by editorial room lawyers. Corbin opines that most courts use the words interchangeably, and this is the conclusion we reached after reviewing the New York cases. But, if your taste runs to the technical, an agreement is the factual predicate for a binding contract, an entirely appropriate task for a jury, while the word contract is a legal conclusion that juries do not typically decide.
Obviously, the size of the verdict and not the underlying legal principles is what makes the case so extraordinary. Though Pennzoil's loss in expectation terms was in excess of $7 billion, and though Texaco's gain through its acquisition of Getty was in the $10's of billions, some are simply offended by the numbers. Equally as important, some are concerned with any judgment that may trigger bankruptcy. But the question is not a function of the number of zeros in the judgment, nor is it a function of disappearing assets. The issues are ones of law and of who will own and control productive assets. Assets generally do not disappear in a bankruptcy proceeding, only ownership rights change. Further, the legal standard cannot be that if a party intentionally interferes with a large enough contract, and if the damages to the innocent party are massive enough, then the law will forgive all.
III. CONCLUSION
More is at stake in the Pennzoil v. Texaco litigation than many imagine. Some see it as a symbol of uncontrolled juries and declining judicial competence -or even corruption. In our view, however, a major concern is whether corporate giants must live with the same standards of commercial morality and contract law as are applicable to the rest of us. There is a connection between the scandals in the investment banking community, the search for profit irrespective of the law, and the type of corporate behaviour involved in the Pennzoil litigation. Another critical concern is whether the role of the states in contract and tort litigation is to be displaced by a new federalism, one that presumes that state courts are incompetent to apply the law of other states, to provide due process and to weigh federal constitutional claims. Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected this radical reformulation of federalism.' And, finally, we may rightly be concerned about the impact of such claims on the traditional law of contracts.
Historians have long urged that free enterprise thrives and economic growth and efficiency are promoted only in legal systems that enforce contracts. Without contract enforcement, there is no security in bargains, no confidence in economic exchanges. If this principle is ignored, there is much to worry about in terms of the future of American commerce. At a minimum, the law of contracts will not apply equally to all, for large transactions will be exempted. And one might reasonably fear that that exemption will not be limited to mergers and acquisitions. If a corporation has a fiduciary obligation to breach a binding merger agreement, it can argue with equal plausibility that it has a duty to its shareholders to breach lease agreements or equipment or service contracts if it later can secure a more favourable price. And if corporations can dishonour their binding contracts, why not consumers, debtors, bankers and unionized workers?
Before embarking on such a disastrous course, returning the law to the Middle Ages and the rules against enforcement of executory contracts, we would do well to consider the policy implications of a doctrine that so thoroughly undermines our common law traditions, our national economy and our aspirations for moral behaviour in business affairs. As Justice Cardozo stated nearly sixty years ago, contract law "still places stability and certainty in the forefront of the virtues. 'The field is one where the law should hold fast to fundamental conceptions of contract and of duty and follow them with loyalty to logical conclusions' 6 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
This case is submitted to you on special issues consisting of specific questions about the facts, which you must decide from the evidence you have heard in this trial. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but in matters of law, you must be governed by the instructions in this charge. In discharging your responsibility on this jury, you will observe all the instructions which have previously been given you. I shall now give you additional instructions which you should carefully and strictly follow during your deliberations. 1. Do not let bias, prejudice or sympathy play any part in your deliberations. 2. In arriving at your answers, consider only the evidence introduced here under oath and such exhibits, if any, as have been introduced for your consideration under the rulings of the Court, that is, what you have seen and heard in this courtroom, together with the law as given you by the court. In your deliberations, you will not consider or discuss anything that is not represented by the evidence in this case. 3. Since every answer that is required by the charge is important, no juror should state or consider that any required answer is not important. 4. You must not decide who you think should win, and then try to answer the questions accordingly. Simply answer the questions, and do not discuss nor concern yourselves with the effect of your answers. 5. You will not decide an issue by lot or by drawing straws, or by any other method of chance. Do not return a quotient verdict. A quotient verdict means that the jurors agree to abide by the result to be reached by adding together each juror's figure and dividing by the number of jurors to get an average. Do not do any trading on your answers; that is, one juror should not agree to answer a certain question one way if others will agree to answer another question another way. 6. You may render your verdict upon the vote of ten or more members of the jury.
The same ten or more of you must agree upon all of the answers made and to the entire verdict. You will not, therefore, enter into an agreement to be bound by a majority or any other vote of less than ten jurors. If the verdict and all of the answers therein are reached by unanimous agreement, the presiding juror shall sign the verdict for the entire jury. If any juror disagrees as to any answer made by the verdict, those jurors who agree to all findings shall each sign the verdict.
These instructions are given you because your conduct is subject to review the same as that of the witnesses, parties, attorneys and the judge. If it should be found that you have disregarded any of these instructions, it will be jury misconduct and it
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may require another trial by another jury; then all of our time will have been wasted. The presiding juror or any other juror who observes a violation of the court's instructions shall immediately warn the one who is violating the same and caution the juror not to do so again.
When words are used in this Charge in a sense which varies from the meaning commonly understood, you are given a proper legal definition which you are bound to accept in place of any other definition or meaning. By the term "preponderance of the evidence" as used in this Charge, is meant the greater weight and degree of credible evidence before you.
INSTRUCTIONS
I. An agreement may be oral, it may be written or it may be partly written and partly oral. Where an agreement is fully or partially in writing, the law provides that persons may bind themselves to that agreement even though they do not sign it, where their assent is otherwise indicated. 2. In answering Issue No. 1, you should look to the intent of Pennzoil and the Getty entities as outwardly or objectively demonstrated to each other by their words and deeds. The question is not determined by the parties' secret, inward, or subjective intentions. 3. Persons may intend to be bound to an agreement even though they plan to sign a more formal and detailed document at a later time. On the other hand, parties may intend not to be bound until such a document is signed. 4. There is no legal requirement that parties agree on all the matters incidental to their agreement before they can intend to be bound. Thus, even if certain matters were left for future negotiations, those matters may not have been regarded by Pennzoil and the Getty entities as essential to their agreement, if any, on January 3. On the other hand, you may find that the parties did not intend to be bound until each and every term of their transaction was resolved. 5. Every binding agreement carries with it a duty of good faith performance. If
Pennzoil and the Getty entities intended to be bound at the end of the Getty Oil board meeting of January 3, they were obliged to negotiate in good faith the terms of the definitive merger agreement and to carry out the transaction. 6. Modification or discussions to modify an agreement may not defeat or nullify a prior intention to be bound. Parties may always, by mutual consent and understanding, add new provisions spelling out additional terms that were not included in their original agreement.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the end of the Getty Oil board meeting of January 3, 1984, Pennzoil and each of the Getty entities, to wit, the Getty Oil Company, the Sarah C. Getty Trust and the J. Paul Getty Museum, intended to bind themselves to an agreement that included the following terms: a. all Getty Oil shareholders except Pennzoil and the Sarah C. Getty Trust were to receive $110 per share, plus the right to receive a deferred cash consideration from the sale of ERC Corporation of at least $5 per share within five years; b. Pennzoil was to own 3/7ths of the stock of Getty Oil and the Sarah C. Getty Trust was to own the remaining 4/7ths of the stock of Getty Oil; and Punitive damages means an amount that you may in your discretion award as an example to others and as a penalty orby way of punishment, in addition to any amount you may have found as actual damages.
It is not necessary to show that Texaco was motivated by ill will or hatred of Pennzoil.
In assessing punitive damages, if any, you may take into account not merely the act or acts of Texaco itself. You may also take into account all the circumstances, including Texaco's motives and the extent of damages, if any, suffered by Pennzoil.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 6
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the end of the Getty Oil Company Board meeting on January 3, 1984, the Getty Oil Company, the Museum, the Trust, and Pennzoil each intended to be bound to an agreement which provided that the Getty Oil Company would purchase the Museum shares forthwith as provided in the "Memorandum of Agreement"? ANSWER 'WE DO' OR 'WE DO NOT': " WE DO " SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 7
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the end of the Getty Oil Company Board meeting on January 3, 1984, the Getty Oil Company, the Museum, the Trust, and Pennzoil each intended to be bound to an agreement which provided for Pennzoil to have an option to purchase 8 million shares of Getty Oil Company stock as provided in the "Memorandum of Agreement"?
ANSWER 'WE DO' OR 'WE DO NOT': " WE DO" SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 8
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the payment of $110 in cash per share plus the ERC stub was not a fair price as of January 3, 1984?
ANSWER 'IT WAS NOT A FAIR PRICE' OR 'IT WAS A FAIR PRICE': ANSWER: " IT WAS A FAIR PRICE "
You are instructed that a "fair price" is a price reached between a willing buyer, who is not required to buy and a willing seller, who is under no obligation to sell.
After you retire to the jury room, you will select your own presiding juror. The first thing the presiding juror will do is to have this complete charge read aloud and then you will deliberate upon your answers to the questions asked. It is the duty of the presiding juror:
1. to preside during your deliberations; 2. to see that your deliberations are conducted in an orderly manner and in accordance with the instructions in this charge; 3. to write out and hand to the bailiff any communication concerning the case which you desire to have delivered to the judge; 4. to conduct the vote on the issues and participate in that vote; 5. to write your answers to the Issues in the spaces provided; and 6. to certify to your verdict in the space provided for the presiding juror's signature or to obtain the signatures of all the jurors who agree with the verdict if your verdict is less than unanimous. After you have retired to consider your verdict, no one has any authority to communicate with you except the bailiff of this court. You should not discuss the case with anyone, not even with other members of the jury, unless all of you are present and assembled in the jury room. Should anyone attempt to talk to you about the case before the verdict is returned, whether at the courthouse, at your home, or elsewhere, please inform the judge of this fact.
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When you have answered all of the questions which you are required to answer under the instructions of the judge, and your foreman has placed your answers in the spaces provided, and signed the verdict as foreman or obtained the signatures, you will advise the bailiff at the door of the jury room that you have reached a verdict, and then you will return into court with your verdict.
ORIGINAL SIGNED: "SOLOMON CASSEB, JR." JUDGE PRESIDING
CERTIFICATE OF THE JURY
We, the jury, have answered the above and foregoing special issues as herein indicated, and herewith return same into court as our verdict. a. all Getty Oil shareholders except Pennzoil and the Sarah C. Getty Trust were to receive $110 per share, plus the right to receive a deferred cash consideration from the sale of ERC Corporation of at least $5 per share within five years; b. Pennzoil was to own 3/7ths of Getty Oil and the Sarah C. Getty Trust was to own the remaining 4/7ths; and c. Pennzoil and the Sarah C. Getty Trust were to endeavour in good faith to agree upon a plan for restructuring Getty Oil on or before December 31, 1984 , and if they were unable to reach such agreement then they would divide the assets of Getty Oil between them also on a 3/7ths -4/7th basis. ' Answer: "We Do Not" or "We Do".
INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING ISSUE NO. I
I. (Ladies and Gentlemen, the first instruction on the law that I am going to give you concerns what is meant legally by the term "agreement".) An agreement ordinarily takes the form of an offer or proposal made by one person to another, followed by acceptance of the offer by the other. 2 A person who accepts an offer on the condition that one or more terms of that offer be changed has made a counter-offer, which the person who made the original offer may then accept or reject. 3 Offers and counter-offers may be accepted in any manner or by any means reasonable under the circumstances, unless the offer expressly limits acceptance to a particular method. 4 Where the offer merely suggests or invites that the acceptance be communicated in a particular way, other methods of acceptance are permitted. 5 You should also understand that an offer or counter-offer cannot be revoked or withdrawn after it has been accepted. 6 An agreement may be oral, it may be written or it may be partly written and partly oral. 7 Where an agreement is fully or partially in writing, the law provides that persons may bind themselves to that agreement even though they do not sign it, where their assent is otherwise indicated. 8 2. (If there was an offer and-an acceptance, the law next seeks to determine whether the parties "intended to be bound" to an agreement. This is the first of several instructions on what is meant legally by the term "intent to be bound".) In answering Issue No. 1, you should look to the intent of Pennzoil and the Getty entities as outwardly or objectively demonstrated to each other by their words and deeds.' The question is not determined by the parties' secret, inward or subjective intentions.'" This question is not determined by claims made after the dispute arose between the parties as to what they really meant or intended. ' Nor is the question determined by private reservations of one of the parties, if any, that it did not disclose or make known to the others. 2 Thus, if the Getty entities knew or had reason to know that Pennzoil considered itself bound and if the Getty entities nevertheless had their own reservations which they failed to disclose or make known to Pennzoil, then the Getty entities are bound to the agreement.' 3 3. (This instruction concerns the question of intent to be bound in the situation where the parties to the agreement, if any, knew that there was still a further written document or documents to be signed.) Even though Pennzoil and the Getty entities knew that their agreement, if any, was subject to execution of a definitive merger agreement, you may still find that they intended to be bound on the evening of January 3.14 Persons may intend to be bound to an agreement even though they plan to sign a more formal and detailed document at a later time. ' On the other hand, you may conclude that they intended not to be bound until that document was signed. But for you to conclude that the parties did not intend to be bound until that document was signed will require more than just recognizing that the parties contemplated a definitive merger agreement.' 6 Again, you are to focus on the objective or outward conduct of Pennzoil and the Getty entities to each other; it L.Ed.2d 454 (1969); Corbin, supra n. 3, s. 30 at 97; and Pennzoil, supra n. I at 15, 16: "...While parties are not bound until they have executed a formal document embodying their agreement if that was their intention, the fact that they contemplate memorializing their agreement in a formal document does not prevent their less formal agreement from taking effect prior to the execution of the formal document; that where the objective, contemporaneous evidence indicates that the parties have reached an agreement, they are bound by it, regardless of its form or the manner in which it was manifested". 15. Id. 16. V'Soske, supra n. 14 at 404 F.2d 499.
is not sufficient for Texaco to simply show that one or more of the Getty entities secretly intended or agreed among themselves not to be bound until the definitive merger agreement was executed.
7 If you believe that Pennzoil intended to be bound and that the outward conduct of the Getty entities at the time would have led reasonable people to believe that the Getty entities also intended to be bound, then they were bound. 8 4. (This instruction concerns the question of intent to be bound in the situation where the parties knew that there were still other matters to be negotiated.) You may find that Pennzoil and the Getty entities intended to be bound, even if you believe they knew that there were matters on which they had not agreed or on which they expected future negotiations and even if you believe that the new matters, when agreed upon, were to be incorporated into the definitive merger agreement.' 9
There is no legal requirement that parties agree on all the matters incidental to their agreement before they can intend to be bound. 2° Thus, even if certain matters were left for future negotiations, those matters may not have been regarded by Pennzoil and the Getty entities as essential to their agreement, if any, on January 3.21 On the other hand, you may find that the parties did not intend to be bound until each and every term of their transaction was resolved.
5. (This instruction concerns the "duty of good faith" to complete a transaction when there is agreement and when circumstances indicate that the parties intend to be bound to that agreement.) Every binding agreement carries with it a duty of good faith performance. 2 2 It is fundamental to this duty that each party may not act to defeat or destroy the purpose of the agreement." Good faith performance requires faithfulness to the agreed common purpose and requires actions consistent with the justified expectations and beliefs of the other party. 24 So, if Pennzoil and the Getty entities intended to be bound on the evening of January 3, they were obliged to negotiate in good faith the terms of the definitive merger agreement and to carry out the transaction. 2 5 The parties would have to allow each other a reasonable time
17.
Brown Bros. Electrical Contractors, supra n. 9 at 1001; Pennzoil, supra n. I.
18.
Id. and Restatement, supra n. 2 at s. 27, comment b.
19.
Corbin, supro n. in which to agree upon the definitive merger agreement." z Also, one party or group of parties could not flatly repudiate or reject the agreement because of delay in completing the formal documents or completing the transaction. 27 Instead, the dissatisfied party must give the other party notice of the reasons for its dissatisfaction and must allow a reasonable opportunity to remedy or correct any asserted problems. 28 6. (This instruction concerns the question of intent to be bound in the situation where the parties to the agreement knew that the agreement was subject to various approvals.) You may also find that Pennzoil and the Getty entities intended to be bound on the evening of January 3, even though they believed or intended that the agreement, if any, would be subject to regulatory and shareholder approval or other such requirements. 2 9 Parties who intend to bind themselves to an agreement may make their future performance under that agreement subject to the happening of certain events or the satisfaction of certain conditions." Indeed, such events or conditions may be legally necessary to complete the transaction. If Pennzoil and the Getty entities intended to be bound, they had a duty of good faith to undertake to complete the transaction. 3 Consistent with the duty of good faith, no party could get out of the agreement if that party's own action prevented or made impossible the happening of the event or fulfilment of the condition. 3 2 On the other hand, you may find that Pennzoil and the Getty entities did not intend to be bound until all steps such as regulatory approval had been fulfilled. 7. (This instruction concerns whether you may find that the parties had an agreement and that they intended to be bound even if the evidence shows that they, subsequently, agreed to modify the agreement or to include additional terms.) You may also find that Pennzoil and the Getty entities intended to be bound on the evening of January 3, even if you believe that they later discussed or agreed to modify their prior agreement or to include additional terms in it." Modification or discussions to modify an agreement do not defeat or nullify a prior intention to be bound. 34 Parties may always, by mutual consent and understanding, add new provisions spelling out additional terms that were not included in their original agreement."
26.
Glen 55 A competitor has no privilege and is not permitted to interfere with the agreements of those with whom it is in competition. 56 Also, a party is not justified in interfering with the agreement of another simply because it is advancing its own business interests. 57 Further, Texaco may not justify its actions by arguing that the shareholders of Getty Oil
Company may have had an interest in competition for purchase of the Company's stock."' Nor may Texaco justify its actions by arguing that one or more of the Getty entities were dissatisfied with the Pennzoil agreement, if any. 5 9 6. (This instruction concerns how the matter of "fiduciary duties" relates to the issues in this case.) You may also find that Texaco interfered with the Pennzoil agreement, if any, even though the Getty Oil directors, the Museum's President, and Gordon P. Getty, Trustee, were fiduciaries. If those fiduciaries showed an intention to be bound to an agreement with Pennzoil on January 3, they could not avoid that agreement by later seeking or accepting a higher price or a more beneficial arrangement with a third party. 1. (These instructions concern the money damages, if any, which you may find.) The measure of damages in this case is the amount necessary to put Pennzoil in as good a position as it would have had if its agreement with the Getty entities, if any, had been performed. 6 2 In other words, you are to determine the full loss of benefit, if any, suffered by Pennzoil as a result of Texaco's interference, if any, with Pennzoil's agreement with the Getty entities, if any. convincing force. You are not to decide an issue by the simple process of counting the number of witnesses who testified on the opposing sides. The final test is not the relative number of witnesses, but the relative convincing force of the evidence based on a preponderance of the evidence. 5. You are reminded that you must not consider as evidence any statement of legal counsel other than as a witness made during trial. However, to the extent that lawyers gave testimony during the trial of this matter, that testimony is not to be considered by you as a statement of the law to be applied in this case. I will be giving you a statement of the law to be applied in these instructions. 6. In arriving at your verdict, you are not to discuss or speculate about why any ruling has been made by the judge during the course of this trial, nor should you discuss or speculate about what result the judge would like. Your verdict must be based solely and entirely upon the testimony of the witnesses and the evidence admitted during the trial. 7. The intentional destruction of written evidence after litigation has commenced raises a presumption that the document destroyed was unfavourable to the party destroying it. 7 '
